Developing Reasonable

Programs

Matt Might University of Utah matt.might.net

...programs

...programs

...languages


...programs

...languages


...compilers

WARNING






20IX




20IX
















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



35 divisions per second.

2.9 divisions per second.

Performance mattered.









eudocolor ar: precipitation hits: mm/day — 1300.



- 97.82

195.6

64

Performance still matters.





		CHECKING AG				
	Expendi	iture by Category		ACCOUNT		ORIES
				Category	Amount	
		11%		Home	s	(872.40
			ome	Food Gas	5	(226.00 (137.50
		• Fe	bod	Credit Card	5	(850.00
	36%	G		Entertainment	5	(245.00
			redit Card	Total	s	(2,330.90
ANSA	CTIONS			Beginning Balan	ce	\$4,650.0
RANSA	CTIONS			Beginning Balan	ce	\$4,650.0
	Date	Description	Category	Beginning Balan Amount		Balance
	Date 10/1/09	Description Root	Home		(775.00)	Balance 5 3,875.0
-	Date 10/1/09 10/15/09	Description Rent Utilities	Home Home		(775.00) (97.40)	Balance \$ 3,875.0 \$ 3,777.6
e bit Card	Date 10/1/09 10/15/09 10/16/09	Description Root Utilities Fill up SUV for camping trip	Home Home Gas		(775.00) (97.40) (75.00)	Balance 5 3,875.0 5 3,777.6 5 3,702.6
e I bit Card	Date 10/1/09 10/15/09 10/15/09 10/16/09 10/22/09	Description Rent Utilities Fill up SUV for camping trip Groceries	Home Home Gas Food		(775.00) (97.40) (75.00) (101.00)	Balance 5 3,875.0 5 3,777.6 5 3,702.6 5 3,601.6
pe I bit Card bit Card I	Date 10/1/09 10/15/09 10/16/09	Description Root Utilities Fill up SUV for camping trip	Home Home Gas		(775.00) (97.40) (75.00) (101.00) (125.00)	Balance S 3,875.0 S 3,875.0 S 3,777.6 S 3,702.6 S 3,601.6 S 3,476.6
pe bit Card bit Card bit Card bit Card	Date 10/1.09 10/15/09 10/16/09 10/22/09 10/22/09	Description Reat Utilities Fill up SUV for camping trip Groceries Dinner with Paul and Jane	Home Home Gas Food Food Entertainment		(775.00) (97.40) (75.00) (101.00)	Balance 5 3,875.0 5 3,777.6 5 3,702.6 5 3,601.6 5 3,476.6 5 3,441.6
RANSA pe 1 2 bit Card bit Card 4 bit Card (P (P	Date 10/1/09 10/15/09 10/15/09 10/22/09 10/22/09 10/25/09	Description Root Utilities Fill up SUV for camping trip Groceries Dinner with Paul and Jane Movies	Home Home Gas Food Food		(775.00) (97.40) (75.00) (101.00) (125.00) (35.00)	Balance S 3,875.0 S 3,875.0 S 3,777.6 S 3,702.6 S 3,601.6 S 3,476.6 S 3,441.6 S 3,576.6
pe l bit Card bit Card i bit Card 2P 3P	Date 10/1/09 10/15/09 10/15/09 10/22/09 10/22/09 10/25/09 10/25/09	Description Reat Utilities Fill up SUV for camping trip Groceries Dinner with Paul and Jace Movies Insurance refund	Home Home Gas Food Food Entertainment Deposit		(775.00) (97.40) (75.00) (101.00) (125.00) (35.00) 135.00	Balance S 3,875.0 S 3,875.0 S 3,777.6 S 3,702.6 S 3,601.6 S 3,476.6 S 3,476.6 S 3,576.6 S 3,576.6 S 3,576.6 S 5,101.6
pe bit Card bit Card bit Card bit Card P P bit Card	Date 10/1.09 10/15/09 10/15/09 10/25/09 10/25/09 10/25/09 10/25/09 10/29/09	Description Root Utilities Fill up SUV for camping trip Groceries Directer with Paul and Jane Movies Insurance refund Paycheck	Home Home Gaa Food Food Entertainment Deposit Deposit		(775.00) (97.40) (75.00) (101.00) (125.00) (35.00) 1.55.00 1.525.00	Balance 0 \$ 3,875.0 0 \$ 3,777.6 0 \$ 3,702.6 0 \$ 3,601.6 0 \$ 3,476.6 0 \$ 3,476.6 0 \$ 3,476.6 0 \$ 3,576.6 0 \$ 5,101.6 0 \$ 5,039.1
pe l bit Card bit Card f bit Card 2P	Date 10/1.09 10/15/09 10/15/09 10/15/09 10/22/09 10/25/09 10/25/09 10/29/09 10/30/09 10/31/09	Description Description Ront Utilities Fill up SUV for camping trip Groceries Dinner with Paul and Jane Movies Insurance refund Paychack Fill up SUV again	Home Home Gaa Food Food Entertainment Deposit Deposit Gas		(775.00) (97.40) (75.00) (101.00) (125.00) (35.00) 1.35.00 1.525.00 (62.50)	Balance S 3,875.0 S 3,875.0 S 3,777.6 S 3,702.6 S 3,601.6 S 3,476.6 S 3,476.6 S 3,476.6 S 3,476.6 S 5,101.6 S 5,039.1 S 5,039.1 S 5,039.1

Correctness matters.










Correctness really matters.









Security matters.


What makes software slow, buggy and insecure?

We can't predict it.

We can't reason.

We can't engineer.

Software "engineering"



PowerPoint

A fatal exception OE has occurred at 0137:BFFA21C9. The current application will be terminated.

- * Press any key to terminate the current application.
- * Press CTRL+ALT+DEL again to restart your computer. You will lose any unsaved information in all applications.

Press any key to continue _

ANDALIESPACE

Microsoft Windows

The system has recovered from a serious error.


A log of this error has been created.

Please tell Microsoft about this problem.

We have created an error report that you can send to help us improve Microsoft Windows. We will treat this report as confidential and anonymous.

To see what data this error report contains, click here.

Send Error Report





We need engineering.

We need reasonable programs.

We need prediction.

So, why can't we predict what software will do?

So, why can't we predict what software will do?

Because Alan Turing said we can't.



"Thou shalt not write a program which determines whether a program halts."



while P(x)

Interesting question?


Interesting question? Undecidable.


But,


there's a loop hole ...


there's a loop hole ...


...in the loop hole.














Another way?

Don't use Turing machines.

Static analysis


Sub-Turing languages


How do you play the static analysis game?





















How to approximate?

Make it finite!









Why is static analysis hard?

animal.eat(food);

What is animal?

animal.eat(food);


What is food?

void process (Animal animal) {
 food = world.gather();
 animal.eat(food);

Who calls process?

void process (Animal animal) {
 food = world.gather();
 animal.eat(food);
}

What is world?



Why so entangled?

Value = Object

Value = Object = Class + Record

Value = Object = Class + Record \subseteq Code + Data

Old idea: Untie code & data.

(In ten minutes)

What language exemplifies code + data?

λ -calculus.

λ -calculus (Church, 1928)

• Minimalist, universal language

Alonzo Church



- Minimalist, universal language
- Three expression types:
 - v [variable]



- Minimalist, universal language
- Three expression types:
 - v [variable]
 - $e_1(e_2)$ [function application]

Alonzo Church



- Minimalist, universal language
- Three expression types:
 - v [variable]
 - $e_1(e_2)$ [function application]
 - $\lambda v. e$ [anonymous function]





 $(\lambda x \cdot x^2)(3) = 9$

Lisp and Scheme

• $v \equiv V$

•
$$f(e) = (f e)$$

• $\lambda v.e = (lambda (v) e)$

Python

• $v \equiv v$

•
$$f(e) = f(e)$$

•
$$\lambda v.e = lambda v: e$$

Ruby

•
$$v \equiv \mathbf{V}$$

•
$$f(e) = f(e)$$

• $\lambda v.e = lambda \{ |v| return e \}$

JavaScript

•
$$v \equiv v$$

•
$$f(e) = f(e)$$

• $\lambda v.e =$ function (v) { return e ; }

Java

•
$$v \equiv v$$

- f(e) = f(e)
- λv.e = new Value () { public Value call (Value v) { return e ; } ;

λ -fortified

- Ruby • Lisp • Java
- SML • C#
- Haskell
 - C++
 - Python

- Smalltalk
- JavaScript
- PHP(!)

• Scala

Value = Closure

Value = Closure = Lambda + Env

Value = Closure = Lambda + Env \subseteq Code + Data

Assertion: If we can do λ 's, we can do objects.

How to bound control?

Control-flow question

Given a call site f(x), what could f be?

f(x)

let $f = \lambda z.z$ in f(x)



Classical approach

The approximation


- Value = Code x Data
- Closure = Lambda x Env
- Object = Class x Record


The approximation


- Value = Code
- Closure = Lambda
- Object = Class


How do λ 's flow?


$e_1(e_2)$

















 $\lambda v.e_b \in FlowsTo[e_1]$ and val ∈ FlowsTo[e_b] val ∈ FlowsTo[e_1(e_2)]

 $\frac{\lambda v.e_b \in FlowsTo[e_1] \text{ and } val \in FlowsTo[e_b]}{val \in FlowsTo[e_1(e_2)]}$

$\lambda v.e_b \in FlowsTo[\lambda v.e_b]$

$\frac{\lambda v.e_b \in FlowsTo[e_1] \text{ and } val \in FlowsTo[e_b]}{val \in FlowsTo[e_1(e_2)]}$

 $\frac{\lambda v.e_b \in FlowsTo[e_1]}{val \in FlowsTo[v]} and val \in FlowsTo[e_2]$

OCFA (Shivers, 1988)

 $\{\lambda v.e_b\} \subseteq FlowsTo[\lambda v.e_b]$

 $\lambda v.e_b \in FlowsTo[e_1]$ FlowsTo[e_b] \subseteq FlowsTo[e_1(e_2)]

 $\frac{\lambda v.e_b \in FlowsTo[e_1]}{FlowsTo[e_2] \subseteq FlowsTo[v]}$

OCFA (Shivers, 1988)

 $\{\lambda v.e_b\} \subseteq FlowsTo[\lambda v.e_b]$

 $\lambda v.e_b \in FlowsTo[e_1]$ FlowsTo[e_b] \subseteq FlowsTo[e_1(e_2)]

 $\frac{\lambda v.e_b \in FlowsTo[e_1]}{FlowsTo[e_2] \subseteq FlowsTo[v]}$

OCFA (Shivers, 1988)

 $\{\lambda v.e_b\} \subseteq \operatorname{FlowsTo}[\lambda v.e_b]$

 $\frac{\lambda v.e_{b} \in FlowsTo[e_{1}]}{FlowsTo[e_{b}] \subseteq FlowsTo[e_{1}(e_{2})]}$

 $\frac{\lambda v.e_b \in FlowsTo[e_1]}{FlowsTo[e_2] \subseteq FlowsTo[v]}$

+ Constraint Solver

= Control-flow analysis

But...

It's slow.


lt's weak.


It's imprecise.


map f list


fireMissile(n)


map f list
















Problem: Cross-flow



Problem: Cross-flow



No attention to order.

Monotonic.

A different approach: Small-step analysis

(Joint work with David Van Horn)

Easier to understand.

Simpler to derive.

Faster to compute.

A program is an infinite state machine.

An analysis is a finite state machine.


Small-step machine

Small-step machine


• Convert program e into machine state \mathbf{s}_0


Small-step machine


- Convert program e into machine state s_0
- \bullet Transition from state s_n to state s_{n+1}





Analysis machine
















Analysis machine




Theorem: The analysis simulates the machine.

"Concrete"






Small-step analysis...









... is bounded graph search.

... is bounded graph search.



Finite state-space



Example: Small steps for CPS

$f, e \in \mathsf{Exp} = \mathsf{Var} + \mathsf{Lam} + \mathsf{App}$

$f,e\in\mathsf{Exp}=\mathsf{Var}+\mathsf{Lam}$

$f, e \in \mathsf{Exp} = \mathsf{Var} + \mathsf{Lam}$ $lam \in \mathsf{Lam} ::= (\lambda (v_1 \dots v_n) call)$

$f, e \in \mathsf{Exp} = \mathsf{Var} + \mathsf{Lam}$ $lam \in \mathsf{Lam} ::= (\lambda (v_1 \dots v_n) call)$ $call \in \mathsf{Call} ::= (f e_1 \dots e_n)$

No call returns

Callers pass callbacks

Still Turing-complete

Concrete state-space

$\varsigma \in \Sigma = \mathsf{Call} \times \mathit{Env}$

Concrete state-space

$\varsigma \in \Sigma = \mathsf{Call} \times \mathit{Env}$ $\rho \in \mathit{Env} = \mathsf{Var} \rightharpoonup \mathit{Clo}$

Concrete state-space

 $\varsigma \in \Sigma = \mathsf{Call} \times \mathit{Env}$ $\rho \in \mathit{Env} = \mathsf{Var} \rightharpoonup \mathit{Clo}$ $\mathit{clo} \in \mathit{Clo} = \mathsf{Lam} \times \mathit{Env}$

Concrete semantics

$(\Rightarrow) \subseteq \Sigma \times \Sigma$

Concrete semantics

$\mathcal{E}: \operatorname{Exp} \times Env \longrightarrow Clo$

$\mathcal{E}(lam, \rho) = (lam, \rho)$ $\mathcal{E}(v, \rho) = \rho(v)$

$(\llbracket (f e_1 \dots e_n) \rrbracket, \rho) \Rightarrow (call, \rho''), where$

 $(\llbracket (f \ e_1 \dots e_n) \rrbracket, \rho) \Rightarrow (call, \rho''), \text{ where}$ $(\llbracket (\lambda \ (v_1 \dots v_n) \ call) \rrbracket, \rho') = \mathcal{E}(f, \rho)$

 $(\llbracket (f \ e_1 \dots e_n) \rrbracket, \rho) \Rightarrow (call, \rho''), \text{ where}$ $(\llbracket (\lambda \ (v_1 \dots v_n) \ call) \rrbracket, \rho') = \mathcal{E}(f, \rho)$ $clo_i = \mathcal{E}(e_i, \rho)$

$$(\llbracket (f \ e_1 \dots e_n) \rrbracket, \rho) \Rightarrow (call, \rho''), \text{ where}$$
$$(\llbracket (\lambda \ (v_1 \dots v_n) \ call) \rrbracket, \rho') = \mathcal{E}(f, \rho)$$
$$clo_i = \mathcal{E}(e_i, \rho)$$
$$\rho'' = \rho' [v_i \mapsto clo_i]$$

To analyze?

Make it finite!

Abstract state-space

 $\varsigma \in \Sigma = \mathsf{Call} \times \mathit{Env}$ $\rho \in \mathit{Env} = \mathsf{Var} \rightharpoonup \mathit{Clo}$ $\mathit{clo} \in \mathit{Clo} = \mathsf{Lam} \times \mathit{Env}$

Abstract state-space $\varsigma \in \Sigma = \operatorname{Call} \times Env$ $\rho \in Env = Var \rightarrow$ Clo $clo \in Clo = Lam \times Env$

Abstract state-space $\varsigma \in \Sigma = \operatorname{Call} \times Env$ $\rho \in Env = Var \rightarrow$ Clo $clo \in Clo = Lam \times Enw$

Abstract state-space $\varsigma \in \Sigma = \mathsf{Call} \times Env$ $\rho \in Env = Var \rightarrow$ Clo $clo \in Clo = Lam \times Enw$

Abstract state-space

 $\varsigma \in \Sigma = \mathsf{Call} \times \mathit{Env}$ $\rho \in \mathit{Env} = \mathsf{Var} \rightharpoonup \mathit{Clo}$ $\mathit{clo} \in \mathit{Clo} = \mathsf{Lam} \times \mathit{Env}$

Abstract state-space

 $\varsigma \in \Sigma = \text{Call} \times Env$ $\rho \in Env = \text{Var} \rightharpoonup Clo$ $clo \in Clo = \text{Lam}$

Abstract state-space $\varsigma \in \Sigma = \mathsf{Call} \times Env$ $\rho \in Env = \operatorname{Var} \rightharpoonup \mathcal{P}\left(\operatorname{Clo}\right)$ $clo \in Clo = Lam$

Abstract state-space $\hat{\varsigma} \in \hat{\Sigma} = \mathsf{Call} \times Env$ $\hat{\rho} \in \widehat{Env} = \operatorname{Var} \rightharpoonup \mathcal{P}\left(\widehat{Clo}\right)$ $clo \in Clo = Lam$

 $\alpha(lam, \rho) = lam$

$\alpha(call,\rho) = (call,\alpha(\rho))$

$\alpha(\rho) = \lambda v. \left\{ \alpha(\rho'(v)) : \rho' \text{ is reachable in } \rho \right\}$

Abstract semantics

$(\sim) \subseteq \hat{\Sigma} \times \hat{\Sigma}$

Abstract semantics

$\mathcal{E}: \mathsf{Exp} \times Env \longrightarrow Clo$

Abstract semantics

 $\hat{\mathcal{E}}: \operatorname{Exp} \times \widehat{Env} \to \mathcal{P}\left(\widehat{Clo}\right)$

 $\hat{\mathcal{E}}(lam, \hat{\rho}) = (lam, \hat{\rho})$ $\hat{\mathcal{E}}(v,\hat{\rho}) = \hat{\rho}(v)$

 $\mathcal{E}(lam, \hat{\rho}) = \{lam\}$ $\hat{\mathcal{E}}(v,\hat{\rho}) = \hat{\rho}(v)$

$(\llbracket (f e_1 \dots e_n) \rrbracket, \hat{\rho}) \rightsquigarrow (call, \hat{\rho}'), where$

•

$(\llbracket (f \ e_1 \dots e_n) \rrbracket, \hat{\rho}) \rightsquigarrow (call, \hat{\rho}'), \text{ where}$ $\llbracket (\lambda \ (v_1 \dots v_n) \ call) \rrbracket \in \hat{\mathcal{E}}(f, \hat{\rho})$


$(\llbracket (f \ e_1 \dots e_n) \rrbracket, \hat{\rho}) \rightsquigarrow (call, \hat{\rho}'), \text{ where}$ $\llbracket (\lambda \ (v_1 \dots v_n) \ call) \rrbracket \in \hat{\mathcal{E}}(f, \hat{\rho})$ $\hat{C}_i = \hat{\mathcal{E}}(e_i, \hat{\rho})$

 $(\llbracket (f \ e_1 \dots e_n) \rrbracket, \hat{\rho}) \rightsquigarrow (call, \hat{\rho}'), \text{ where}$ $\llbracket (\lambda \ (v_1 \dots v_n) \ call) \rrbracket \in \hat{\mathcal{E}}(f, \hat{\rho})$ $\hat{C}_i = \hat{\mathcal{E}}(e_i, \hat{\rho})$ $\hat{\rho}' = \hat{\rho} \sqcup [v_i \mapsto \hat{C}_i]$

$$(\llbracket (f \ e_1 \dots e_n) \rrbracket, \hat{\rho}) \rightsquigarrow (call, \hat{\rho}'), \text{ where}$$
$$\llbracket (\lambda \ (v_1 \dots v_n) \ call) \rrbracket \in \hat{\mathcal{E}}(f, \hat{\rho})$$
$$\hat{C}_i = \hat{\mathcal{E}}(e_i, \hat{\rho})$$
$$\hat{\rho}' = \hat{\rho} \sqcup v_i \mapsto \hat{C}_i \rrbracket$$


$$(\llbracket (f \ e_1 \dots e_n) \rrbracket, \hat{\rho}) \rightsquigarrow (call, \hat{\rho}'), \text{ where}$$
$$\llbracket (\lambda \ (v_1 \dots v_n) \ call) \rrbracket \in \hat{\mathcal{E}}(f, \hat{\rho})$$
$$\hat{C}_i = \hat{\mathcal{E}}(e_i, \hat{\rho})$$
$$\hat{\rho}' = \hat{\rho} \sqcup [v_i \mapsto \hat{C}_i]$$


$$(\llbracket (f \ e_1 \dots e_n) \rrbracket, \rho) \Rightarrow (call, \rho''), \text{ where}$$
$$(\llbracket (\lambda \ (v_1 \dots v_n) \ call) \rrbracket, \rho') = \mathcal{E}(f, \rho)$$
$$clo_i = \mathcal{E}(e_i, \rho)$$
$$\rho'' = \rho' [v_i \mapsto clo_i]$$




Theorem: If the concrete takes a step, then the abstract can take a matching step.









Order between states is preserved.

Monotonic growth not required.


How about the next level?

ANF

$f, \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathsf{AExp} = \mathsf{Var} + \mathsf{Lam}$ $e \in \mathsf{Exp} ::= (\mathsf{let} ((v \ call)) \ e')$ $\mid call$ $\mid \boldsymbol{x}$ $call \in \mathsf{Call} ::= (f \ \boldsymbol{x}_1 \dots \boldsymbol{x}_n)$

 $\Sigma = \mathsf{Exp} \times \mathsf{Env} \times \mathsf{Store} \times Kont$ $Env = \mathsf{Var} \rightharpoonup Addr$ $Store = Addr \rightarrow Clo$ $Kont = \mathsf{Var} \times \mathsf{Exp} \times Env \times Kont + \{\mathsf{halt}\}$ Addr is an infinite set of addresses

$$\begin{split} \Sigma &= \mathsf{Exp} \times \mathsf{Env} \times \mathsf{Store} \times \mathit{Kont} \\ \mathit{Env} &= \mathsf{Var} \rightharpoonup \mathit{Addr} \\ \mathit{Store} &= \mathit{Addr} \rightarrow \mathit{Clo} \\ \mathit{Kont} &= \mathsf{Var} \times \mathsf{Exp} \times \mathit{Env} \times \mathit{Kont} + \{\mathsf{halt}\} \\ \mathit{Addr} \text{ is an infinite set of addresses} \end{split}$$



 $\Sigma = \mathsf{Exp} \times \mathsf{Env} \times \mathsf{Store} \times Kont$ $Env = \mathsf{Var} \rightharpoonup Addr$ $Store = Addr \rightarrow \quad Clo$ $Kont = \mathsf{Var} \times \mathsf{Exp} \times Env \times Kont + \{\mathsf{halt}\}$ Addr is an infinite set of addresses

$$\begin{split} \Sigma &= \mathsf{Exp} \times \mathsf{Env} \times \mathsf{Store} \times Kont \\ Env &= \mathsf{Var} \rightharpoonup Addr \\ Store &= Addr \rightarrow \qquad Clo \\ Kont &= \mathsf{Var} \times \mathsf{Exp} \times Env \times Addr + \{\mathsf{halt}\} \\ Addr \text{ is an infinite set of addresses} \end{split}$$

 $\Sigma = \mathsf{Exp} \times \mathsf{Env} \times \mathsf{Store} \times Kont$ $Env = \mathsf{Var} \rightharpoonup Addr$ $Store = Addr \rightarrow \quad Clo + Kont$ $Kont = \mathsf{Var} \times \mathsf{Exp} \times Env \times Addr + \{\mathsf{halt}\}$ Addr is an infinite set of addresses

$$\begin{split} \Sigma &= \mathsf{Exp} \times \mathsf{Env} \times \mathsf{Store} \times Kont \\ Env &= \mathsf{Var} \rightharpoonup Addr \\ Store &= Addr \rightarrow \qquad Clo + Kont \\ Kont &= \mathsf{Var} \times \mathsf{Exp} \times Env \times Addr + \{\mathsf{halt}\} \\ Addr \text{ is an } & \mathsf{finite set of addresses} \end{split}$$

$$\begin{split} \Sigma &= \mathsf{Exp} \times \mathsf{Env} \times \mathsf{Store} \times Kont \\ Env &= \mathsf{Var} \rightharpoonup Addr \\ Store &= Addr \rightarrow \mathcal{P}\left(Clo + Kont\right) \\ Kont &= \mathsf{Var} \times \mathsf{Exp} \times Env \times Addr + \{\mathsf{halt}\} \\ Addr \text{ is an } & \mathsf{finite set of addresses} \end{split}$$

And, other machines?

CEK (F&F, 1986)

 $\varsigma \longmapsto_{CEK} \varsigma'$

 $\begin{array}{l} \langle x, \rho, \kappa \rangle \\ \langle (e_0 e_1), \rho, \kappa \rangle \\ \langle v, \rho, \operatorname{ar}(e, \rho', \kappa) \rangle \\ \langle v, \rho, \operatorname{fn}((\lambda x.e), \rho', \kappa) \rangle \end{array}$

 $\langle v, \rho', \kappa \rangle \text{ where } \rho(x) = (v, \rho')$ $\langle e_0, \rho, \operatorname{ar}(e_1, \rho, \kappa) \rangle$ $\langle e, \rho', \operatorname{fn}(v, \rho, \kappa) \rangle$ $\langle e, \rho'[x \mapsto (v, \rho)], \kappa \rangle$

Krivine (ICFP 2010)

 $\varsigma \in \Sigma = Exp \times Env \times Store \times Kont$ $s \in Storable ::= \mathbf{d}(e, \rho) | \mathbf{c}(v, \rho)$ $\kappa \in Kont ::= \mathbf{mt} | \mathbf{c}_1(a, \kappa) | \mathbf{c}_2(a, \kappa)$

CM (ICFP 2010)

 $\begin{array}{c|c} \varsigma \longmapsto_{CM} \varsigma' \\ \hline \\ \hline \langle \text{fail}, \rho, \sigma, \kappa \rangle & \langle \text{fail}, \rho, \sigma, \text{mt}^{\emptyset} \rangle \\ \langle (\text{frame } R \ e), \rho, \sigma, \kappa \rangle & \langle e, \rho, \sigma, \kappa [\overline{R} \mapsto \text{deny}] \rangle \\ \langle (\text{grant } R \ e), \rho, \sigma, \kappa \rangle & \langle e, \rho, \sigma, \kappa [\overline{R} \mapsto \text{grant}] \rangle \\ \langle (\text{test } R \ e_0 \ e_1), \rho, \sigma, \kappa \rangle & \left\{ \begin{cases} \langle e_0, \rho, \sigma, \kappa \rangle & \text{if } \mathcal{OK}(R, \kappa), \\ \langle e_1, \rho, \sigma, \kappa \rangle & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\ \mathcal{OK}(\emptyset, \kappa) \\ \mathcal{OK}(R, \text{mt}^m) & \Longleftrightarrow & (R \cap m^{-1}(\text{deny}) = \emptyset) \\ \mathcal{OK}(R, \text{ar}^m(e, \rho, \kappa)) \\ \mathcal{OK}(R, \text{ar}^m(e, \rho, \kappa)) \end{cases} \right\} & \Longleftrightarrow & \begin{array}{c} (R \cap m^{-1}(\text{deny}) = \emptyset) \land \\ \mathcal{OK}(R \setminus m^{-1}(\text{grant}), \kappa) \end{array} \end{array}$

Java (PLDI 2010)

 $\varsigma \in \Sigma = \mathsf{Stmt} \times BEnv \times Store \times KontPtr \times Time$ $\beta \in BEnv = \mathsf{Var} \rightharpoonup Addr$ $\sigma \in Store = Addr \rightharpoonup D$ $d \in D = Val$ $val \in Val = Obj + Kont$ $o \in Obj = \mathsf{ClassName} \times BEnv$ $\kappa \in Kont = \mathsf{Var} \times \mathsf{Stmt} \times BEnv \times KontPtr$ $a \in Addr \text{ is a set of addresses}$ $\overset{\kappa}{p} \in KontPtr \subseteq Addr$

 $t \in Time$ is a set of time-stamps.

C/LLVM

$$\begin{split} \varsigma \in State &= Eval + Apply + AppCont + AppFun \\ Eval &= STMT^* \times FrmPtr \times Conf \times StkPtr \\ Apply &= LHS^* \times D^* \times Eval \\ AppFun &= FUN \times D^* \times FrmPtr \times Conf \times StkPtr \\ AppCont &= Cont \times D \times Conf \end{split}$$

$d \in D$ $val \in Val$ $\kappa \in Cont$ $bas \in Bas$	= Val = $Cont + FUN + Loc + Bas$ = $LHS \times STMT^* \times FrmPtr \times StkPtr$ = a set of basic values
$\begin{array}{l} loc \in Loc \\ a \in Addr \\ sp \in StkPtr \\ fp \in FrmPtr \\ b \in Bind \end{array}$	= Addr + StkPtr + Bind = an infinite set of heap pointers = an infinite set of stack pointers = $StkPtr$ = $VAR \times FrmPtr$
$c \in Conf$	$=$ Store \times Succ \times Pred

- $\sigma \in Store \qquad = Loc \rightharpoonup D$
- $\sigma_{+} \in Succ \qquad = Loc \rightharpoonup Loc \\ \sigma_{-} \in Pred \qquad = Loc \rightharpoonup Loc$


Up next


JavaScript


 $\varsigma \in \Sigma = (\mathsf{Stmt} + \mathsf{Body}) \times BEnv \times Store \times FPtr \quad [\mathsf{st}]$ $\beta \in BEnv = \mathsf{Var} \rightharpoonup Addr \qquad [b]$ $\sigma \in Store = Addr \rightharpoonup D \qquad [\mathsf{st}]$ $d \in D = Val \qquad [d]$ $val \in Val = Bas + Clo + Kont + Loc \qquad [va]$ $bas \in Bas = String + Num + Boolean \qquad [b]$ $clo \in Clo = \mathsf{Fun} \times BEnv \qquad [c]$ $\kappa \in Kont ::= \mathsf{ret}(v, \beta, s, fp) \qquad [ret]$ $e \mathbf{x}(v, \beta, s, fp, s') \qquad [e]$ $a \in Addr = Bind + Field + FPtr \qquad [ad]$ $field \in Field = Loc \times String \qquad [o]$ $fp \in FPtr = Contour \qquad [fr]$ $cn \in Contour \text{ is an infinite set of contours}$ $loc \in Loc \text{ is an infinite set of locations}$

[states]
[binding environments]
[stores]
[denotable values]
[denotable values]
[values]
[basic values]
[basic values]
[closures]
[return continuations]
[exceptional continuations
[addresses]
[bindings]
[object fields]
[frame pointers]


Bonus: Compositionality









Application: Array-bounds checks



i < length(a)</pre>



i < length(a)</pre>



What about sub-Turing domain-specific languages?

Regex Yacc Datalog SQL

Avoid halting problem.

WARNING

RFC 2616 (HTTP 1.1)

2.1 Augmented BNF

All of the mechanisms specified in this document are described in both prose and an augmented Backus-Naur Form (BNF) similar to that used by <u>RFC 822</u> [9]. Implementors will need to be familiar with the notation in order to understand this specification. The augmented BNF includes the following constructs:

```
media-type = type "/" subtype *( ";" parameter )
type = token
subtype = token
```

HTTP-Version = "HTTP" "/" 1*DIGIT "." 1*DIGIT

LWS = [CRLF] 1*(SP | HT)

http_URL = "http:" "//" host [":" port] [abs_path ["?" query]]

Chunked-Body = *chunk last-chunk	HTTP-date = <u>rfc1123</u> -date <u>rfc850</u> -date asctime-date <u>rfc1123</u> -date = wkday "," SP date1 SP time SP "GMT" <u>rfc850</u> -date = weekday "," SP date2 SP time SP "GMT" asctime-date = wkday SP date3 SP time SP 4DIGIT
trailer	date1 = 2DIGIT SP month SP 4DIGIT
CRLF	; day month year (e.g., 02 Jun 1982)
	date2 = 2DIGIT "-" month "-" 2DIGIT
chunk = chunk-size [chunk-extension] CRLF	; day-month-year (e.g., 02-Jun-82)
chunk-data CRLF	date3 = month SP (2DIGIT (SP 1DIGIT))
chunk-size = 1*HEX	; month day (e.g., Jun 2)
<pre>last-chunk = 1*("0") [chunk-extension] CRLF</pre>	time = 2DIGIT ":" 2DIGIT ":" 2DIGIT
	; 00:00:00 - 23:59:59
chunk-extension= *(";" chunk-ext-name ["=" chunk-ext-val])	wkday = "Mon" "Tue" "Wed"
chunk-ext-name = token	"Thu" "Fri" "Sat" "Sun"
chunk-ext-val = token quoted-string	weekday = "Monday" "Tuesday" "Wednesday"
chunk-data = chunk-size(OCTET)	"Thursday" "Friday" "Saturday" "Sunday"
<pre>trailer = *(entity-header CRLF)</pre>	month = "Jan" "Feb" "Mar" "Apr"
	"May" "Jun" "Jul" "Aug"
	"Sep" "Oct" "Nov" "Dec"

RFC 3501 (IMAPv4)

address	<pre>= "(" addr-name SP addr-adl SP addr-mailbox SP addr-host ")"</pre>	b	= 1*body SP media-subtype
addr-adl	= nstring	body-cype-mparc	[SP body-ext-mpart]
	, non-air	body-type-msg	<pre>= media-message SP body-fit SP body SP body-fid-line</pre>
addr-host		body-type-text	= media-text SP body-field
		capability	= ("AUTH=" auth-type) / at ; New capabilities MUS
addr-mailbox	<pre>= nstring ; NIL indicates end of [<u>RFC-2822</u>] group; if</pre>		; registered with IANA ; standards-track
	<pre>; non-NIL and addr-host is NIL, holds ; [RFC-2822] group name.</pre>	annahility data	= "CAPABILITY" *(SP capabi
	<pre>; Otherwise, holds [<u>RFC-2822</u>] local-part ; after removing [<u>RFC-2822</u>] quoting</pre>	capabilicy-data	*(SP capability) ; Servers MUST implement
addr-name	= nstring		; and LOGINDISABLED ca ; Servers which offer
	<pre>; If non-NIL, holds phrase from [<u>RFC-2822</u>] ; mailbox after removing [<u>RFC-2822</u>] guoting</pre>		; list "IMAP4" as the
append	= "APPEND" SP mailbox [SP flag-list] [SP date-time] SP literal	CHAR8	= %x01-ff ; any OCTET except NUL
astring	= 1*ASTRING-CHAR / string	command	<pre>= tag SP (command-any / co command-select) CRLF</pre>
ASTRING-CHAR =	ATOM-CHAR / resp-specials		; Modal based on state
atom	= 1*ATOM-CHAR	command-any	<pre>= "CAPABILITY" / "LOGOUT" ; Valid in all states</pre>
ATOM-CHAR	<pre>= <any atom-specials="" char="" except=""></any></pre>	command-auth	= append / create / delete
atom-specials	<pre>= "(" / ")" / "{" / SP / CTL / list-wildcards / quoted-specials / resp-specials</pre>		rename / select / status ; Valid only in Authen
authenticate	= "AUTHENTICATE" SP auth-type *(CRLF base64)	command-nonauth	= login / authenticate / "; ; Valid only when in N
auth-type	<pre>= atom ; Defined by [SASL]</pre>	command-select	= "CHECK" / "CLOSE" / "EXP
base64	= *(4base64-char) [base64-terminal]		uid / search ; Valid only when in S
base64-char	= ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/"	continue-req	= "+" SP (resp-text / base
		сору	= "COPY" SP sequence-set S
	= (2base64-char "==") / (3base64-char "=")	create	= "CREATE" SP mailbox ; Use of INBOX gives a
	<pre>= "(" (body-type-lpart / body-type-mpart) ")"</pre>	date	
body-extension	<pre>= nstring / number / "(" body-extension *(SP body-extension) ")"</pre>	date-dav	<pre>= date-text / DQUOTE date- = 1*2DIGIT</pre>
	; Future expansion. Client implementations ; MUST accept body-extension fields. Server	uace-uay	; Day of month
	; body-extension fields except as defined by	date-day-fixed	= (SP DIGIT) / 2DIGIT ; Fixed-format version
	; future standard or standards-track ; revisions of this specification.	date-month	= "Jan" / "Feb" / "Mar" /
body-ext-1part	= body-fld-md5 [SP body-fld-dsp [SP body-fld-lang		"Jul" / "Aug" / "Sep" /
	; MUST NOT be returned on non-extensible	date-text	= date-day "-" date-month
b		date-year	= 4DIGIT
body-ext-mpart	<pre>= body-fld-param [SP body-fld-dsp [SP body-fld-lang [SP body-fld-loc *(SP body-extension)]]] ; MUST NOT be returned on non-extensible : "BODY" fetch</pre>	date-time	= DQUOTE date-day-fixed "- SP time SP zone DQUOTE
body-fields	<pre>= body-fld-param SP body-fld-id SP body-fld-desc SP</pre>	delete	= "DELETE" SP mailbox ; Use of INBOX gives a
,	body fld and SD body fld actate	digit-nz	= %x31-39
body-fld-desc	= nstring		; 1-9
body-fld-dsp	= "(" string SP body-fld-param ")" / nil	envelope	<pre>= "(" env-date SP env-subj env-sender SP env-reply-</pre>
body-fld-enc	<pre>= (DQUOTE ("7BIT" / "8BIT" / "BINARY" / "BASE64"/ "QUOTED-PRINTABLE") DQUOTE) / string</pre>	env-bcc	<pre>env-bcc SP env-in-reply- = "(" 1*address ")" / nil</pre>
body-fld-id	= nstring	env-cc	= "(" 1*address ")" / nil
body-fld-lang	= nstring / "(" string *(SP string) ")"	env-date	= nstring
body-fld-loc	= nstring	env-from	= "(" 1*address ")" / nil
body-fld-lines	= number	env-in-reply-to	= nstring
-	= nstring	env-message-id	= nstring
body-fld-octets		env-reply-to	= "(" 1*address ")" / nil
	= "(" string SP string *(SP string SP string) ")" / nil	env-sender	= "(" 1*address ")" / nil
body-type-1part	<pre>= (body-type-basic / body-type-msg / body-type-text) [SP body-ext-lpart]</pre>	env-subject	= nstring

body-type-basic = media-basic SP body-fields ; MESSAGE subtype MUST NOT be "RECR22"

ody-type-mpart	= 1*body SP media-subtype [SP body-ext-mpart]	examine
ody-type-msq	on body fields on	fetch
	SP body SP body-fld-lines	fetch
		fetch-att
apability	<pre>= ("AUTH=" auth-type) / atom ; New capabilities MUST begin with "X" or be ; registered with TANA as standard or ; standards-track</pre>	
apability-data	 "CAPABILITY" *(SP capability) SP "IMAP4rev1" *(SP capability) ; Servers MUST implement the STARTILS, AUTH-PLAIN, and LOCUMICRUE D. capabilition 	flag flag-exten
IAR8	= %x01-ff ; any OCTET except NUL, %x00	
ommand	<pre>= tag SP (command-any / command-auth / command-nonauth / command-select) CRLF ; Modal based on state</pre>	flag-fetch
ommand-any	- CAPABILITY / LOGOUT / NOOP / X-COmmand	flag-keywo flag-list
ommand-auth	= append / graate / delete / evamine / list / lowh /	flag-perm
	; Valid only in Authenticated or Selected state	greeting
ommand-nonauth	; valid only when in Not Authenticated state	header-fld
ommand-select	<pre>= "CHECK" / "CLOSE" / "EXPUNGE" / copy / fetch / store / wid / search</pre>	header-lis
	; Valid only when in Selected state	list
ontinue-req	- + SP (resp-text / base64) CRLP	list-mailb
ру	= "COPY" SP sequence-set SP mailbox	list-char
reate	= "CREATE" SP mailbox	list-wildo literal
ate	= date-text / DQUOTE date-text DQUOTE	
ate-day	= 1*2DIGIT	login lsub
ate-day-fixed		mailbox
ate-month	= "Jan" / "Feb" / "Mar" / "Apr" / "May" / "Jun" / "Jul" / "Aug" / "Sep" / "Oct" / "Nov" / "Dec"	
	= date-day "-" date-month "-" date-year	
ate-year	= 4DIGIT	
ate-time	= DQUOTE date-day-fixed "-" date-month "-" date-year SP time SP zone DQUOTE	mailbox-da
elete	= "DELETE" SP mailbox ; Use of INBOX gives a NO error	mailbox-li
igit-nz	= %x31-39	mbx-list-f
nvelope	= "(" env-date SP env-subject SP env-from SP env-sender SP env-reply-to SP env-to SP env-cc SP env bes SD env in reply to SD env mocrace (d))"	mbx-list-o
nv-bcc	= "(" 1*address ")" / nil	
nv-cc	= "(" 1*address ")" / nil	mbx-list-s
nv-date	= nstring	media-basi
nv-from	= "(" 1*address ")" / nil	
nv-in-reply-to	= nstring	
nv-message-id	= nstring	media-mess
nv-reply-to	= "(" 1*address ")" / nil	media-subt
nv-sender	= "(" 1*address ")" / nil	

flag	-	<pre>"\Answered" / "\Flagged" / "\Deleted" / "\Seen" / "\Draft" / flag-keyword / flag-extension ; Does not include "\Recent"</pre>
flag-extension	=	"\" atom ; Future expansion. Client implementations ; MUST accept flag-extension flags. Server ; implementations MUST NOT generate ; flag-extension flags except as defined by ; future standard or standards-track ; revisions of this generilication.
flag-fetch	=	flag / "\Recent"
flag-keyword	=	atom
flag-list	=	"(" [flag *(SP flag)] ")"
flag-perm	=	flag / "*"
greeting	=	*** SP (resp-cond-auth / resp-cond-bye) CRLF
header-fld-name	=	astring
header-list	=	"(" header-fld-name *(SP header-fld-name) ")"
list	=	"LIST" SP mailbox SP list-mailbox
list-mailbox	=	1*list-char / string
list-char	=	ATOM-CHAR / list-wildcards / resp-specials
list-wildcards	=	-8- / -*-
literal	=	"{" number "}" CRLF *CHAR8 ; Number represents the number of CHAR8s
login	=	"LOGIN" SP userid SP password
lsub	=	"LSUB" SP mailbox SP list-mailbox
mailbox	=	<pre>"INBOX" / astring ; INBOX is case-insensitive. All case variants of ; INBOX (e.g., 'iNbOx') MUST be interpreted as INBOX ; not as an astring. An astring which consists of ; the case-insensitive sequence "1" "N" "B "O" "X" ; is considered to be INBOX and not an astring. ; Refer to section 5.1 for further ; semantic details of mailbox names.</pre>
mailbox-data	-	<pre>"FLAGS" SP flag-list / *LIST" SP mailbox-list / "LSUB" SP mailbox-list / "SEARCH" *(SP nz-number) / "STATUS" SP mailbox SP "(" [status-att-list] ")" / number SP "EXISTS" / number SP "RECENT"</pre>
mailbox-list	=	"(" [mbx-list-flags] ")" SP (DQUOTE QUOTED-CHAR DQUOTE / nil) SP mailbox
	=	"(" [mbx-list-flags] ")" SP
mbx-list-flags	=	<pre>'(* [mbx-list-flags] *)* SP (DQUOTE QUOTED-CHAR DQUOTE / nll) SP mailbox *(mbx-list-oflag SP mbx-list-sflag *(sP mbx-list-oflag)</pre>
mbx-list-flags mbx-list-oflag	=	<pre>*(* [mbx-list-flags] *)* SP (DQUOTE QUOTED-CHAR DQUOTE / nil) SP mailbox *(mbx-list-oflag SP) mbx-list-sflag *(SP mbx-list-oflag) / mbx-list-oflag *(SP mbx-list-oflag) *\Noinferiors* / flag-extension</pre>
mbx-list-flags mbx-list-oflag	-	<pre>'(* [mbx-list-flags] *)* SP (DQUOTE QUOTED-CHAR DQUOTE / nil) SP mailbox *(mbx-list-oflag 9P) mbx-list-sflag (sSP mbx-list-oflag) / mbx-list-oflag *(SP mbx-list-oflag) ''Nonferiors' / flag-extension ; Other flags, multiple possible per LIST response ''Noselect' / ''Warked* / "\Unmarked"</pre>
mbx-list-flags mbx-list-oflag mbx-list-sflag media-basic		<pre>'(* [mbx-list-flags] *)* SP (DQUOTE QUOTED-CHAR DQUOTE / nil) SP mailbox *(mbx-list-oflag \$) mbx-list-sflag *(sp mbx-list-oflag) mbx-list-oflag *(SP mbx-list-oflag) *\Noinferiors* / flag-extension ; 0ther flag; multiple possible per LIST response *\Noselect* / *\Marked* / *\Unmarked* ; Selectability flags; oily one per LIST response ((DQUOTE (*APPLICATION* / *AUDIO* / *IMAGE* / *MESSAGE* / *UIDBO*) DQUOTE) / string) SP media=subtype</pre>
mbx-list-flags mbx-list-oflag mbx-list-sflag media-basic		<pre>'(' [mbx-list-flags] ')' SP (DQUOTE QUOTEO-CHAR DQUOTE / nl] SP mailbox *(mbx-list-oflag 9) mbx-list-sflag ('SP mbx-list-oflag) / mbx-list-oflag *(SP mbx-list-oflag) ''Nonferiors' / flag-extension ; other flags; multiple possible per LIST response ''Noselect' / ''Marked' / ''Unmarked' ; Selectability flags; only one per LIST response ((DQUOTE ('APPLICATION' / 'AUDIO' / 'IMAGE' / ''MESSAGE' ''UTDEO') DQUOTE / sting) SP media-subtype ; Defined in [MIME-IMT] DQUOTE 'MESSAGE' DQUOTE SP DQUOTE 'EXCA22' DQUOTE ; Defined in [MIME-IMT]</pre>

= "(" 1*address ")" / nil

= "FETCH" SP sequence-set SP ("ALL" / "FULL" / "FAST" /
fetch-att / "(" fetch-att *(SP fetch-att) ")")

= "ENVELOPE" / "FLAGS" / "INTERNALDATE" / "BDCT%22" [".HEADER" / ".SIZE" / ".TEXT"] / "BOOT% ["STRUCTURE"] / "UID" / "BOOT% Section ["<" number "." nz-number ">"] / "BOOT% Section ["<" number "." nz-number ">"] /

= "EXAMINE" SP mailbox

env-to

media-cexc	; Defined in [MIME-IMT]
message-data	= nz-number SP ("EXPUNGE" / ("FETCH" SP msg-att))
msg-att	<pre>= "(" (msg-att-dynamic / msg-att-static) *(SP (msg-att-dynamic / msg-att-static)) ")"</pre>
msg-att-dynamic	<pre>= "FLAGS" SP "(" [flag-fetch *(SP flag-fetch)] ")" ; MAY change for a message</pre>
msg-att-static	<pre>= "ENVELOPE" SP envelope / 'INTERNALDATE" SP date-time / "BTC522: [.HEADER' / ".TEXT] SP nstring / "BTC522.SIZE" SP number / "BTC522.SIZE" SP number // "BTC522.SIZE" SP number // "BTC522.SIZE" SP number // "DTO" SP uniqueid ''UTO" SP uniqueid ''UTO" SP uniqueid ''UTO" SP uniqueid</pre>
nil	= "NIL"
nstring	= string / nil
number	= 1*DIGIT ; Unsigned 32-bit integer ; (0 <= n < 4,294,967,296)
nz-number	= digit-nz *DIGIT ; Non-zero unsigned 32-bit integer ; (0 < n < 4,294,967,296)
password	= astring
quoted	= DQUOTE *QUOTED-CHAR DQUOTE
QUOTED-CHAR	<pre>= <any except="" quoted-specials="" text-char=""> /</any></pre>
quoted-specials	= DQUOTE / "\"
rename	<pre>= "RENAME" SP mailbox SP mailbox ; Use of INBOX as a destination gives a NO error</pre>
response	= *(continue-req / response-data) response-done
response-data	= *** SP (resp-cond-state / resp-cond-bye / mailbox-data / message-data / capability-data) CRLF
response-done	= response-tagged / response-fatal
response-fatal	<pre>= *** SP resp-cond-bye CRLF ; Server closes connection immediately</pre>
response-tagged	= tag SP resp-cond-state CRLF
resp-cond-auth	<pre>= ("OK" / "PREAUTH") SP resp-text ; Authentication condition</pre>
	= "BYE" SP resp-text
	<pre>= ("OK" / "NO" / "BAD") SP resp-text ; Status condition</pre>
resp-specials	
resp-text	= ["[" resp-text-code "]" SP] text
resp-text-code	<pre>- "ALERT ' / "BADCHARSET" [SP "(" astring *(SP astring) ")"] / capability-data / "PARSE" / "PERMARMENTIAGS" SP "(" [flag-perm *(SP flag-perm] ")" / "READ-ONLY / "READ-WAIRTE" / "TRYCREATE" / "UINDEXT" SP nz-number / "UINDEXT" SP nz-number / atom [SP 1*<any "]"="" except="" text-char="">]</any></pre>
search	<pre>= "SEARCH" [SP "CHARSET" SP astring] 1*(SP search-key) ; CHARSET argument to MUST be registered with IANA</pre>
search-key	<pre>"ALL" / "ANSWEED' / SeC' SP satring / "EFFORE" SP date / SODY' SP satring / "CC' SP satring / "DELETED' / "LAGGED' / "FROM' SP satring / "KENWGKD' SP flag-keyword / "NEW' / 'OLD' / 'ON' SP date / "SEENT' / 'SEEN' / "SINCE" SP date / 'SUBJECT' SP satring / "UNARYWORD' / 'UNDELETED' / 'UNFLAGED' / "UNARYWORD' SP flag-keyword / 'UNSEEN' / ; Above this line were in [IMAP2] "DART' / "HEADER' SP header-fld-name SP satring / "LAGCER' SP number / "NOT' SP search-key / "SENTERFORE' SP date / "SENTCH-Key / "SENTERFORE' SP date / "SENTCH SP shumber / "LAGCER' SP date / "SENTCH SP shumber / "LOT' SP sequence-set / "UNDELFT" / sequence-set / "(" search-key "(SP search-key ')")"</pre>

= DQUOTE "TEXT" DQUOTE SP media-subtype

media-text

"TEXT" ; top-level or MESSAGE/RFC822 part section-part = nz-number *("." nz-number)
 ; body part nesting section-spec = section-msgtext / (section-part ["." section-text]) section-text = section-msgtext / "MIME"
 ; text other than actual body part (headers, etc.) = "SELECT" SP mailbox select = nz-number / "*" seq-number ; message sequence number (COPY, FETCH, STORE ; message sequence number (COPY, FETCH, STORE ; commands) or unique identifier (UD COPY, ; UID FETCH, UID STORE commands). ; * represents the largest number in use. In ; the case of message sequence numbers, it is ; the number of message in a non-empty malibox. ; In the case of unique identifier, it is the ; unique identifier of the last message in the ; malibox or, if the malibox is empty, the ; malibox is current UIDMETY value. ; The server should respond with a tagged BAD ; response to a command that uses a message ; sequence number greater than the number of ; messages in the selected malibox. This ; includes *** if the selected malibox is empty. = seq-number ":" seq-number ; two seq-number values and all values between ; these two regardless of order. ; Kxample: 2:4 and 4:2 are equivalent and indicate ; values 2, 3, and 4. ; Kxample: a unique identifier sequence range of ; 2301:* includes the UID of the last message in ; the mailbox, even if that value is less than 3291. seq-range sequence-set = (seq-number / seq-range) *(*," sequence-set)
; set of seq-number values, regardless of order.
; Servers MAY coalesce overlaps and/or execute the
; sequence in any order.
; Example: a message sequence number set of
; 2,4:7,9,12: for a mnilbox with 15 messages is
; equivalent to 2,4;5,6;7,9,12,13,14,15
; Example: a message sequence number set of *:4,5:7
; for a mnilbox with 10 messages is equivalent to
; 10,9;8,7,6;5,4;5,6;7, and MX be reordered and
; overlap coalesced to be 4,5,6,7,8,9,10. status = "STATUS" SP mailbox SP "(" status-att *(SP status-att) ")" status-att = "MESSAGES" / "RECENT" / "UIDNEXT" / "UIDVALIDITY" / UNSEEN status-att-list = status-att SP number *(SP status-att SP number) = "STORE" SP sequence-set SP store-att-flags store string = quoted / literal subscribe = "SUBSCRIBE" SP mailbox tag = 1*<any ASTRING-CHAR except "+"> text = 1*TEXT-CHAR = <any CHAR except CR and LF> TEXT-CHAR = 2DIGIT ":" 2DIGIT ":" 2DIGIT time ; Hours minutes seconds = "UID" SP (copy / fetch / search / store)
; Unique identifiers used instead of message
; sequence numbers uid = nz-number
; Strictly ascending uniqueid = "UNSUBSCRIBE" SP mailbox unsubscribe userid = astring x-command = "X" atom <experimental command arguments> = (*+* / *-*) 4DIGIT
; Signed four-digit value of hhmm representing
; hours and minutes east of Greenwich (that is,
; the amount that the given time differs from
; Universal Time). Subtracting the timezone
; from the given time will give the UT form. zone

= "[" [section-spec] "]"


section-msgtext = "HEADER" / "HEADER.FIELDS" [".NOT"] SP header-list /

section


RFC 2812 (IRC)

```
The Augmented BNF representation for this is:
message
          = [ ":" prefix SPACE ] command [ params ] crlf
prefix
          = servername / ( nickname [ [ "!" user ] "@" host ] )
          = 1*letter / 3digit
command
params
          = *14( SPACE middle ) [ SPACE ":" trailing ]
          =/ 14( SPACE middle ) [ SPACE [ ":" ] trailing ]
nospcrlfcl = %x01-09 / %x0B-0C / %x0E-1F / %x21-39 / %x3B-FF
               ; any octet except NUL, CR, LF, " " and ":"
middle
          = nospcrlfcl *( ":" / nospcrlfcl )
trailing = *( ":" / " " / nospcrlfcl )
SPACE
          = %x20
                         ; space character
crlf
          = %x0D %x0A ; "carriage return" "linefeed"
target
          = nickname / server
msgtarget = msgto *( "," msgto )
msgto
          = channel / ( user [ "%" host ] "@" servername )
msqto
          =/ ( user "%" host ) / targetmask
msqto
          =/ nickname / ( nickname "!" user "@" host )
          = ( "#" / "+" / ( "!" channelid ) / "&" ) chanstring
channel
             [ ":" chanstring ]
servername = hostname
host
          = hostname / hostaddr
hostname = shortname *( "." shortname )
shortname = ( letter / digit ) *( letter / digit / "-" )
             *( letter / digit )
              ; as specified in <u>RFC 1123</u> [HNAME]
hostaddr = ip4addr / ip6addr
ip4addr = 1*3digit "." 1*3digit "." 1*3digit "." 1*3digit
ip6addr
         = 1*hexdigit 7( ":" 1*hexdigit )
          =/ "0:0:0:0:0:" ( "0" / "FFFF" ) ":" ip4addr
ip6addr
nickname = ( letter / special ) *8( letter / digit / special / "-" )
targetmask = ( "$" / "#" ) mask
               ; see details on allowed masks in section 3.3.1
chanstring = %x01-07 / %x08-09 / %x0B-0C / %x0E-1F / %x21-2B
chanstring =/ %x2D-39 / %x3B-FF
               ; any octet except NUL, BELL, CR, LF, " ", "," and ":"
channelid = 5(8x41-5A / digit); 5(A-Z / 0-9)
          = 1*( %x01-09 / %x0B-0C / %x0E-1F / %x21-3F / %x41-FF )
user
               ; any octet except NUL, CR, LF, " " and "@"
          = 1*23( %x01-05 / %x07-08 / %x0C / %x0E-1F / %x21-7F )
key
               ; any 7-bit US ASCII character,
               ; except NUL, CR, LF, FF, h/v TABs, and " "
letter
          = %x41-5A / %x61-7A
                                     ; A-Z / a-z
          = %x30-39
                                     ; 0-9
digit
hexdigit = digit / "A" / "B" / "C" / "D" / "E" / "F"
special
          = %x5B-60 / %x7B-7D
                ; "[", "]", "\", "`", "_", "^", "{", "|", "}"
```

Efficient parsing techniques exist.



Parsing tools abound.



State of the art?

*buf++

Apache

2,179 lines of C

lighttpd

1,211 lines of C

freenode IRCD

> 2000 lines of C

Courier IMAP

2,633 lines of C

Result?

				Details	
CVE-	ID			Vulnerable systems:	
		re at Nationa	al Vulnerability Databa	* mIRC version 6.1 and prior	
(nation • Vulnerable Software	Me Immune systems:	
Dest Vulnerability Details : CV IRCnet IRCD Buffer Overflow			CD Buffer Overflow	* mIRC version 6.11 When mIRC is installed, it registers its own handler for URL of the	
The I (child	mod_access.c in lighttpd 1.4.			type "irc". Calling "irc://irc.hackme.com" from our web irc.hackme.com server. By inputting an overly long strin	g to the "irc" protoc
Refe	Publish Date : 2007-07-23 Last I IRC buffer o	Secunia ID	SA9999	instruction pointer, thus controls the program's executio	n.
Note	Collapse All E (IRC_Daemo	CVE-ID	CVE-2003-0864	Example: irc://[buffer] where's buffer >998 bytes	
• G • U	- CVSS Sco Apache 1.3.37 h	Release Date	16 Oct 2003	An attacker would be able to gain access to the target s Hence, he can have his code executed under the current	
• M • <u>U</u>	Cvs Cor From: "Matias Soler" <g< td=""><td>Last Change</td><td>20 Oct 2003</td><td></td><td></td></g<>	Last Change	20 Oct 2003		
Buffer o	Diver Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2007 17	Criticality	Not Critical		be modified,
	Synopsis: Apache 1.3 Version: 1.3.37 (late	Solution Status	Vendor Patch		e.)
C	PI Product	Software	IRCnet IRCD 2.x		
Comp Apache htpasswd util: V Pla		Where	Local system		-
In	A buffer overflow vil: npo environment where the		as been found, it is d uid root.	angerous only on	
Target	Mile Details				
As	<pre>sigr ====== Incorrect validation strcpy, to a fixed si File: htpasswd.c, Line</pre>	ze buffer.	of user input allows t	o copy a string, via	
	Keywords: FixedInTrunk, Pat		Mar 11	2004 12:00AM	
D	epends on:		Jul 12	2009 03:06AM	
	Blocks:		These	issues were disclosed by the vendor.	
	Show dependency	/ <u>tree</u>	Inter7 Inter7	Courier-IMAP 2.2.1 Courier-IMAP 2.2.0 Courier-IMAP 2.1.2 Courier-IMAP 2.1.1	

Why is a second second

Yacc blocks on read().

Yacc needs continuations.

The continuation of a parser is its derivative.

For more, google: "Yacc is Dead"

The future is...

The future is...

...safe, correct

The future is...

...safe, correct

...domain-specific

The future is...

...safe, correct


...domain-specific


...deep analysis

Thanks! matt.might.net @mattmight

- POPL 2006: Analysis of environments & stacks
- ICFP 2006: Abstract garbage collection
- PLDI 2006: Enabling coroutine fusion
- POPL 2007: Logic-flow analysis (for arrays)
- PLDI 2010: Featherweight Java analysis
- ICFP 2010: Deriving small-step analyzers
- SFP 2010: Pushdown small-step analysis
- POPL 2011: Small-step analysis on the GPU

Application: Dependence analysis





Dependence analysis



Dependence analysis

What resources are written?





What resources are read?

Which calling contexts are live on stack?

Context-sensitive dependence graphs

Context-sensitive dependence graphs






f() || g()

Advanced technique: Abstract garbage collection

Abstract objects can die too.

Effects of abstract GC

Effects of abstract GC




Effects of abstract GC


Vicious cyle

Merging (⊔)



Vicious cyle





Orders of magnitude